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Summary findings
Drawing  on the new institutional  economics,  Stone's  Responses  to an enterprise  survey show  that problems
study  of Brazil's  machine  tool industry  extends  an earlier  with formal  conflict  resolution  rank low, although  the
study of the garment  industry  in two ways.  machine  tool industry  is characterized  both by greater
First,  it broadens  the original  study  to a second  compliance  with formal rules and by greater  reliance  on
industry,  which  could either confirm  or amend  the  specific,  long-term  contracts  than the garment industry.
original  conclusions.  In fact, machine  tool firms  report a higher  rate of
Second,  it locks at the effect  of economic  uncertainty  customers  honoring  orders  and making  timely  payments
and expensive  formal means  of resolving  conflic,  on an  than do garment  firms.
industry  where  enforceable  contracts  appear necessary  Compliance  is indeed assured  by a sort of 'exchange
for normal business  transactions.  The machine  tool  of hostages.' The supplier's  hostage  is the irretrievable
industry  is characterized  by longer-term  contracts  and by  investment  of physical  and human-capital  in a product
commitments  of resources  to products  that could not  difficult  to sell  to another customer.  The customer's
easily  be sold to another  customer  (asset  specificity).  hostage  is the specific  technology  bound  up in the
More formalistic  approaches  to law  and development  machine  being  produced  and a payment  system  that
would  suggest  that only a legal system  that enforces  ensures  a substantial  sunk investment  in the machine  by
promises  in a "knowledgeable,  sophisticated,  and low-  the time of delivery.
cost way"  would allow  transactions  in this industry  The only  attribute  of contracts  that is frequently
(Williamson).  By  contrast,  the new institutional  renegotiated  is the indexation  of payments,  motivated  by
economics  looks at other means  of governing  agreements  macroeconomic  instability.  Qualitative  evidence  suggests
- including  what Oliver  Williamson  describes  as  that this process  adds substantially  to transaction  costs.
"bilateral  efforts  to create and offer hostages."  Not surprisingly,  machine  tool producers, like  their
The results  show that, while the Brazilian  machine  tool  counterparts  in the garment  industry,  place a high
industry  has saffered  from a reduction  in protection  and  priority  on a more stable  macroeconomnic  and policy
the effects  of a turbulent  macroeconomic  environment,  environment.
long-term  contracts  for specialized  equipment  are
unexpectedly  secure.
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1. Introduction
This study of Brazil's machine  tools industry  extends  an earlier garment industry study' in two
dimensions:
First, it broadens  the original study to a second industry,  wiiich  could either confirm  or amend
conclusions  made earlier on the basis of the garment sector; and
Second, it looks at the effect of economic  uncertainty  and expensive  formal conflict  resolution
on an industry where enforceable  contracts appear necessary  for nonrmal  business  transactions.
The machine tools industry is characterized  by considerably  longer-term  contracts and greater
specificity  of assets (explained  below) than is the garment industry.
The results show that, while the machine tools industry has suffered from a reduction in
protection  and the effects of a turbulent  macroeconomic  environment,  long-term  contracts  for specialized
equipment  are unexpectedly  secure. Compliance  is assured  on the part of the supplier by his inability
to sell the product  to another customer,  while payment by the customer is assured  by her need for the
product and a payment system that ensures a substantial sunk investment  in the machine by the time
of delivery.  The only attribute of contracts that appears subject to frequent renegotiation is the
indexation of payments, motivated by macroeconomic  instability;  a process that qualitative evidence
suggests adds substantially  to transactions  cost.
II.  Some Methodological  Issues
Formalistic  versus New Institutional  ARproaches The earlier paper observes that legal formalism, as
embraced by  the Law and  Development literature 2,  suggests that the  key to  efficient economic
transactions  lies in near perfect formal law and formal enforcement  and conflict  resolution  mechanisms;
while the New Institutional Economics suggests that important roles may be played by  informal
institutions, whose relative efficiency must be judged empirically. In the garment study, we asked
whether the effectiveness in that sector of informal institutions such as credit checking mechanisms
would suffice in a sector where producers had to make irreversible  commitments of resources well
before the final sale -- that is, where a transaction  involved  specific assets.
'  See Andrew  Stone, Brian  Levy  and Ricardo  Paredes,  Public  Institutions  and Private Transactions:
The Legal and Regulatory Environment  for  Rusiness  Transactions  in Brazil and Chile.  (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper 891, 1992)
2  In the earlier paper, this literature  was described  as follows: "Law and Development"  holds that
rapid market-based  economic  growth  depends on: a system of simple,  transparent laws and regulations;
consistent interpretation  and enforcement (like cases are treated alike); just  and rapid resolution of
conflicts (justice deferred is justice denied); and a social attitude of respect for legal and regulatory
institutions.  The common law systems of England and the United States, as well as the civil legal
systems of Western European  countries are taken as ideals. Deviations  from the ideal [are understood
to] obstruct development. Ibid.2
Surprisingly, one predic:tion  of NIE is that formal law matters less for transactions involving
specific assets (or with highly specialized  characteri-tics)  than those involving general ones, because
of the time and expense required for formal legal enf,rcvment.  Oliver Williamson, in his classic
discussion  of contracts made in the context of "ineversible,  specialized  investment",  ooserves:
That the study of credible commitments has been relatively neglected is explained by the
aforementioned  assumption,  common  to both law and economics,  that the legal system enforces
promises in  a  knowledgeable, sophisticated, and  low-cost way.  Albeit instructive, this
convenient  assumption is commonly  contradicted  by the facts -- on which account additional
or alternative modes of governance  have arisen  Bilateral efforts to create and offer hostages
are an interesting  and, as it turns out, economically  important  illustration.'
Buyer and seller exchange "hostages"  in the form of down payments  and specific technology provided
by the buyer; and specific, sunk investments  in physical and human capital on the part of the seller.
These hostages ensure observance  of the terms of the contract and provide a strong incentive  for quick
resolution of conflicts.
Thus, in a sense, legal formalism  and NIE have near opposite predictions for the importance
of the legal system in contracting in this sector.  From a  formalistic perspective, the higher the
specificity  of characteristics  of the product,  the longer  the werm  of the contract,  and the greater the risk
in tying up resources in a  particular transaction, the more need there would be for superior legal
contracts and formal enforcement  mechanisms  to support  them. NIE suggests  that even under advanced
legal systems, buyers and sellers will work out their own solutionts  to such problems, attempting to
avoid the expense, delay and imprecision  of court rulings.
The Field Surveys  Forty-three  firms were surveyed  in two weeks of interviews  in Sao Paulo State.
Of these, three were deemed large, because  they had 500 or more employees, 16 were medium, having
between 100 and 500 employees, and 24 were small, having fewer than 100 employees. There were
no microenterprises  among our sample  (although  one firm had essentially  laid off al  ,.s  employees).
Invaluable  assistance was leant by ABIMAQ,  a syndicate  of industrial producers,  whmc.i  scheduled  33
of the interviews  among  its members. The other firms were added to the sample  to counter the potential
bias introduced by membership  in a trade association.
As in the first study, our attention focused on the impact of Brazil's difficult environment  on
business transactions in four areas:  entry  and  regulation,  which concern business-government
transactions; and  orders and credit,  which involve business to  business transactions.  The one
significant  difference from the earlier work was a set of questions concerning  adjustments  for inflation
and payment schedules,  questions particularly  important  for the longer term contracts of this industry.
One cautionary note limits comparisons of the machine tools and garment sectors:  machine tools
enterprises had been hit hard by the recession  and were surveyed  one year after garment firms.  Thus
3  Oliver Williamson,  The Economic  Institutions  of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985) pp.
167-83
the use of labor force size to categorize firm size may be decopdive:  in better times, our sample would
have compriscJ far fewer small firms and more medium and large ones. 4
111.  The Machine Tools Industry 5
The machine tools sector was selected  because of the asset specificity  of many transactions in
the industry. Its products are highly differentiated 6 and its high end is dominated  by custom designed
equipment. The machine  tools industry is characterized  by relatively long-term contracts (orders may
typically take from two months to eighteen  months to fill) and the commitment  of a significant  bundle
of assets to specific transactions. Thus, a fundamental question of this study was what constraints
policy, regulation and formal legal sste-ns  inipose  on business  transactions  in such an industry.
The machine tools industry' is one that has traditionally  been regarded as technologically  and
strategically  important  to developed  industrial economies. Since the late 1950s,  Brazil's machine  tools
industry has enjoyed substantial protection as part of government import substitution and  export
promotion  policies. The machine  tools industry has enjoyed at least two booms -- one in the late 1970s
(peaking in 1979 with production  of $441.3 million, in 1980 dollars), and another in the lh.te 1980s.
Exports grew rapidly in the 1970s,  peaking in 1981 in response to the Mexican oil boom.  Yet the
majority of production has always sold to the domestic market.  While :omprising only about 1% of
world machine  tc.As  production,  Brazil has been  the largest  producer  among  developing  countries. Over
75% of this production takes place in Sao Paulo state.  Recently, a combination of recession and
reduction in these supportive  policies have diminished and changed the industry substantially. Since
about 1989,  overall production  has since been in serious decline.
Throughout most of the 1970s and  1980s, the machine tools industry enjoyed substantial
protection. An import  tariff on machine  tools varied between 53 and 62 percent. Wogart  estima  , that
total protection  (including reduction of or exemption  from important  domestic taxes) totalled 88% in
1988. Furthermore. the government  extended a large amount of subsidized  credit (particularly from
BNDES) for  domestic purchases of  domestically produced machines.  Nonetheles  s,  substantial
4  We exp,..,mented  with basing firm size on the mid-point  between peak employment  and current
employment,  to counteract  the effect of the current recession. Under this calculation,  there were 5 large
firms, 24 medium firms, and 14 small firms in our sample. However,  subsequent  examination  did not
yield systematic  differences in variables by firmn  size under this assumption.
5  Most of the information in this section is derived from Jan Peter Wogart and Uwe Corsepius,
Skill-Intensive  Manufacturing  in  Development:  The  Case  of  Brazil's  Ifachinery,  Electrical  and
Electronics  Sectors (Mohr, Germany:  Tubingen, 1990) pp. 5-52
6  In 1980, product  diversification  in Machine  Tools was higher  than any other manufactured  export
sector, with 214 separate  8 digit BTN items in the commodity  group. (In a distant second was Boilers,
with  124 BTN items.)  See Claudio Frischtak and Izak Atiyas  Industrial Regulatory Policy and
Investment  Incentives  in Brazil  (Washington:  World Bank,  1"90)  Restricted
'  Machine tools are "power  tools used in machining"  [primarily  metal]. In the Brazilian  domestic
market, automobile companies  comprise the largest industrial customer.4
exemptions and exceptions to this protection 8, combined with an export interest, kept Brazilian costs
remarkably competitive overall (an average of 7% higher than world prices in 1978).  Protectionist
pc";cies have harmed the industry in at least one  important way:  they have raised the price of
components.  In particular, due to a restrictive informnatics  law, electronic components required for
computer numerically-controlled  (CNC) machines  cost fai more in the Brazilian  market than in OECD
countries. 9
Wogart (1990) describes the machine tools industry internationally  as one that is typically
characterized  by a few large firms, concentrating  on the production  of whole machines,  and many small
and medium-sized firms that produce parts and components, frequently as subcontractors with or
subsidiaries of the large companies.  He suggests that Brazilian firms may not f  ,y benefit from
economies of scale in production,  may be too vertically integrated,  and may be overdiversified  in their
product lines.  In Brazil, few firms qualified as  "large" by the employment criteria set out  in the
garment sector study, and there are a number of medium-sized and small firms that are vertically
integrated producers of finished machine tools.'0 Note that the high degree of vertical integration
(evident from Wogart's work and interviews),  by comparison  to international  norms and the low degree
of subcontracting  (available from the survey)  appear symptomatic  of a poor contracting  environment.
Yet it niay also be explained  by limited  competition: Frischtak  and Atiyas's 1990  study found moderate
to high barriers  to mobility and competition  in the "made-to-order"  machinery  subsector  due to "limited
access to  FINAME finance.""  The  .xtent to which FINAME picked incumbent winners in the
machine  tnols  industry is not entirely clear, but it clearly has influence  both in who it finances and,  i
the context of rapid inflation,  how quickly it provides finance for a given supplier's products.
IV. Businiess-Govemnment  Transactions
Entr  and Registration  Status  Firms in this sector are, overall, older than those in the garment trade:
the average age was 27 years. Consequently,  entry data from the current study was sparse: only seven
firms had recently registered or re-regiscered  their firms.  Of these, four had reverted '  )m a public
company (S.A.) to a limited liability  company  (Limitada). Those that used lawyers  or other  professional
8 Wogart  observes  that CACEX  had extraordinary  discretion  over which capital goods imports  were
subject to the "law of similars", judgements on domestic content, and other regulations affecting
protection.
9 It is thus not surprising  that the two leading  complaints  of our sample  about inputs concerned  the
high cost of local goods (63% of firms identified  this as a problem  and the poor quality of local goods
(40%).  Larger firms are partially able to overcome  this by importing,  but then confront high duties.
One third of large firms (i.e. one firm)  and 25% of medium firms complained  about import  duties, while
less than 5% of small firms identified  this problem.
'°  "Large" is of course, a relative term.  Wogart notes the predominance  of small firms in the
machinery  sector. Brazilian  firms may in fact be (or have  been until recently)  larger  than their optimal
size because of excessive vertical and horizontal integration,  protection,  and reliance on more labor-
intensive technologies.
"  Frischtak  and Atiyas, Ibid.5
facilitators reported no  special problems with the process, winh the exception of one  firm tha:
encountered  some problems  with approval  by the environmental  autho-ity of Sao Paulo and one where
the pertners had disagreements  that created legal complexities. Two firms were able to register as
iimitadas for $500 in about one month. One firm completed  the re-registration  process using its own
personnel, going completely by the book, requiring nine months to complete the process. 2 Earlier
work suggested tha: law and accounting firns  use despechantes' 3 to expedite registration for their
clients.  This firmn's  experience seems to confirm the efficacy and economy of using intermediaries  as
an institutional  s t' stitute.
One important trend was the movement  away from public ("S.A.") corporate status towards
private, limited liability status.  The legal and bureaucratic requirements of S.A. status are widely
regarded as excessive, and the inv^stment  environment  apparently  offers little compensation  in terms
of raising capital through public offerings of shares.  Firms are particularly reluctant to publish their
balance sheets, a requirement  of S.A. status which they feel puts them at a competitive  disadvantage.
Regulhtion Regulatory  data affords  a direct comparison  between  the garment  and machine  tools sectors.
As in tha garment sector, tax regulation  imposed  an enormous burden on firms in terms of accounting
and  filing requirements.  Overall, machine tools firms found federal tax requirements the  most
burdensome  area' 4, in part due to a recent requirement  (rescinded  during the period of the survey)  that
companies file  monthly balance sheets and  income statements with their tax  payments.  This
necessitated  monthly inventories  and nearly impossible  accounting  burden. Ranked responses  suggest
that large firms are the most troubled by taxes and, in particular,  that federal taxes stand out as more
Jifficult f'-  arge firms than for medium and small ones.
An important  obstacle for machine tools businesses  that did not appear in the garment sect.
was trade regulation. Fifteen firms (34% of the sample) volunteered  that trade and foreign exchange
regulations were a problem for them.  Specifically, problems were encountered  both importing and
exporting.  Furthermore, the informatics  law had forced them to use far more ex(pensive  indigenous
suppliers of computer numerical  control (CNC) equipment. Thus, in discussing input problems,  fully
one third of the firms volunteered  that the quality of domestic  inputs was a leading constraint. Several
firms praised import liberalization  affecting components,  but criticized  the existence of a higher duty
on foreign components  than on finished  foreign machine  tools, with which they had to compete.
Perhaps because of the larger size of firms and of individual  transactions,  machine  tools firms
felt compelled  to go "by the book"  in their transactions,  admitting  to remarkably  little informal  behavior
compared to the garment sector. This may explain why, in machine tools, labor regulations weighed
12  Of seven firms responding, two took one month to register, one took two months, one three
months, one 14 weeks, one nine months and r..e  --  which converted  to an SA, took 2 years, in part due
to internal problems.
"  Literally, dispatchers, these "fixers" help individuals and businesses to work through or get
around government  regulations.
14  State tax regulations  came in second and labor regulations  a close third. Had trade and foreign
exchange regulations been included  as an option,  they would have been ranked fourth, with municipal
tax regulations and building and property regulations  completing  the set.6
most heavily on small firms, and least heavily on large ones:  unlike the garment sector, there is no
escape for small firms through informality.'  Labor regulatiors may thus pose an entry barrier. Some
57% of firms acknowledged  paying  jeitinhos 16 (vs. 76%j  for the garment sector sample) yet, unlike the
garment sector, few described the vaiue of these payments  as being a significant  cost.  In two cases,
respondents reported ha, ..ig made significant  payments  to expedite foreign trade, where officials can
delay critical shipments  in and out of the country on technical grounds.
Figure I compares two measures of regulatorv costs between garments and machine tools
sectors: the percentage  of propi  ietor's time and of employees' time expended  on compliance activities.
Overall,  the percentage  of proprietor's or senior management's  time required for regulatory  compliance
activities was higher in the machine  tools sector than in garments: 26.3% for medium firms and 19.2%
for small firms vs. 13% an'  '5% in the earlier study.  Perhaps because of the importance of trade
regulations or because of the j,reater formality,  regulations  require more management  time within the
nachinc tools sector. However,  the average percentage  of employees' time required  was slightly less:
4.2% overall versus 4.9% in the original study.  However, both sectors compare unfavorably in this
regard  to the Chilean garment sector,  whicih  required  only .4% of its fulltime  labor force for compliance
activities.
In addition  to time, a substantial  number  of firms require  professional  assistance  to manage taxes
or regulatory problems  (see Table 1). As with garment firmns,  use of an external accountant
declines with firm size, in part because of the economies  of internalizing  the fuinction  created by the
TABLE 1:  Use and Cost of Externa' Assistance  with Tax and Other Reguiation
(A) % Using Accountant  (B) % Using Auditor or  I(  )onthly  Cost of
_  ~~~~~~Consultant  (A) + (B) (in $ U.S.)I
Small  42  33  702
Medium  6  60  1307
Large  .1  0  100  4167
Overall  26  48  1010  I
reguiatory environment. However,  we also asked machine tool firms abuu the use of auditors and
accountants necessitated by tax regulation, and found that this increased with firm size.  Thus, the
overal;  expense of  external assistance rose  with  firm  size  (although small  firms'  expense is
IS  By contrast, in the garment sector study, labor regulations were least binding for the very
smaallest  Brazilian firms (a score of .47 for firms with 25 or fewer employees),  more binding for larger
small firms (.66), most binding for medium-sized  firms (.70), and a considerably  less binding  for large
firms (.56).  In Chile, the scores were .28 for all smali firms, .46 for medium firms, and .41 for large
firms.
16  meaning "little fix", a jeitinho is one of several words for bribes used to sinooth relations
between government  officials and private enterprises.Figure  1
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disproportionally  large when norma!ized  by fulltime employment). Over half the firms reported using
a lawyer to deal with regulation. Most paid on a case by case basis, but of only four firns  reporting
a monthly charge, the average cost was $415.
Constraint scores assigned to regulatory constraints do not demonstrate a  clear "threshold
burden" like that discusb.-d  in the original study, but instead  indicate  regulatory  disincentives  to entry. 1"
Table 2 details the average scores given by respondents  to the severity  of constraint imposed by three
types of regulation  relative to Ather  constrainis,  with a score of zero for the least binding and a score
of one .or the most binding. Rer'ilatory buidens are consistently identifled  as greater bv very small
than by small flnns, and in two of three categories,  very small firms rank  constrailts higher than do
medium and large firms.  In the case of labor regulations,  the constraint score steaiily declines with
firm  size -- suggesting  the portibility of a high initial fixed cost to regulatory  compliance.
TABLE 2:  The Burden of Regulatory  Constraints  by Firm Size
Very Small Firms  Small Firms  Medium  Large Firms
(<25 fulltime  (25-99 fulltime  Firms
__________________  employees)  employees)  l
Tax Bureaucmcy  .71  .58  .72  .75
Labor Regulations  .68  .65  .57  .42
Other Bureracratic  .54  .41  .49  .42
Procedures
Figure 2 compares  conflict resolution mechanisms  used in the garmnents  sector to those use in
the machine  tools sector.  In general,  machine  tools firmns  are somewhat  more likely than garment firmns
to pursue disagreements  with the government and to use a formal appeals process or lawsuit in that
dispute. This difference  is most marked  among  small firms. There was a general  perception  that courts
are now independent  of the government,  reflected  in the fact that 8'% of those who had pursued formal
appeals or lawsnits would do so again in the future under similar circumstances. As with the garnent
sector, the larger the firm, the more likely it was to pursue formal legal appeal. However,  even among
small firns, the higher degree of formality  of operations  in this sector appears  to imply a lower rate of
informal  conflict  resolution,  such as direct negotiation  with an official  or informal  appeal to his superior.
V.  Business-Business  T-..isactions
Renegotiation  of orders: In the garments sector  study, we reised the question  of wbat the implications
of Brazil's environment  for business  transactions  for an indus.rv  requiring long-term  commitments  and
transaction-specific  investments. We inquired  whether  Brazil's histitutional  arnangements  are adequate
for firms to commit asse  o production  specific to another  firrn's demand,  noting that any inability  to
commit resources  to long-term  inter-firm  relationships  could undermine  the dynamism  of private sector
development. It may thus seem surprising at first thiat  contracts were actually more reliable in the
17  A  thresho!d  burden describes  a sudden,  discontinuous  increase in costs encountered  when a firm
grows beyond a certain size or threshold. For a more detailed description,  see Brian Levy, Obstacles
to the Development of Indigenous  Small and Medium Enterprises:  An Empirical  Assessment. (World
Bank Policy Research Working  Paper #588, February 1991)Figure  2
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machine tools  industry than in  garments.  Figure 3  illustrates an  important difference between
contracting in th. machine  tools as opposed  to the garments  sector: contracts arc generally  more secure
in machine  tools.  Renegotiation  rates are one third lower in normal tinmes  and over 40% lower in crisis
times. Alt'iough the rate of renegotiation  is still high (averaging 5% in nornal times compared to 2.3%
at all times for the Chilean garment industry),  in machine  tools renegotiations  almost always involve
adjustment of the infation  index and/or rescheduling  of payments, rather than changes in the price,
quantity or qualities of machines ordered.
Responses to  questions on  inflation adjustment mechanisms suggest that  considerable
transactions costs are associated with agreement between buyer and seller on the index by which to
adjust prices to inflation.  While monopolists  can dictate terms, most suppliers must negotiate with
customers how payments will be adjusted over time.  The inflation rate is highly unpredictable,  and
perceptions  of past government  manipulation  and discontinuation  of indices has led to suspicion about
reliance on any one mechanism. Entrepreneurs  would like to base their transactions  on the dollar, but
this is technically illegal.  Nonetheless,  a reported 11% of sales are based on some form of dollar
agreement. The majority of sales, some 79%, are based on indexed prices. While many finrns  use a
government index over the short term (e.g. 30 days), for longer  term payments  a variety of indices are
used, sometimes through a weighted average (which is sometimes a disguised way to engage in the
illegal practice  of using pegging  prices to the dollar). Some 15 different indices  were cited to us as the
basis for inflation adjustment. Reaching agreement  on the index comprises  an additional negotiation
once price and  other terms have been agreed upon.  Renegotiation sometimes is  stimulated by
dissatisfaction  by buyer or seller with the performance  of an index against the actual inflation rate.
Nonetheless,  as we observed  at the outset, orders  are more  reliable in the machine  tools industry
than in garments. Machine tools tend to be more specialized to the needs of a particular consumer,
giving somewhat  symmetrical incentives  to supplier and consumer  to honor orders:  the supplier will
have some difficulty selling a machine to another customer, while the customer cannot operate her
business without the specialized equipment, and the servicing and spare parts supply for existing
equipment  he may be have from the supplier. 8 Furthermore,  suppliers  "take hostages"  on customized
machine orders:  they demand a downpay.nent averaging 25% of the value of the machine, and
intermediate  payments  averaging a further 18%. In general, the greater the initial investment  required
by the producer and the more customized  the machine,  the higher the payments are before delivery." 9
The data reveal a trend towards increased  standardization  of product. Firms report an increase
in sales from stock from 24.2% of total sales before to 33% now, and a concomitant decrease in
production on order from 67.7% to 56% of sales. This may be due less to contractual problems  than
to recession and restructuring. First, it is usually  the larger machines that are purchased  on order -- in
the current economy, orders for such equipment  are rare.  Second, some firms are finding  economies
to larger production runs, hence more sales from stock. This is consistent  with Wogart's observations,
noted above. Nonetheless,  there is a considerably  higher  percentage  of sales on order in machine tools
Is Oliver Williamcon,  in his classic  text The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: Free
Press, 1985),  observes much the same phenomenon: "Inasmuch  as the value of [specialized  physical]
capital in other uses is, by definition, much smaller than the specialized use for which it has been
intended, the supplier is effectively committed  to the transaction  to a significant  degree. The effect is
often symmetrical,  moreover, in that the buyer cannot turn to alternative  sources of supply and obtain
the item on favorable terms, since the cost of supply from unspecialized  capital is presumabiy  great."
[p. 62]  Williamson goes on to describe  the commitment  mechanism  of "mutual hostage  taking".
'9  Suppliers  reported  that down-payments  and intermediate  payments  have shrunk  during  the current
slum , due to their desperation to conclude sales.Figure  3
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than in the case of garments,  and anecdotal  evidence  suggests  that the degree of customization  of these
orders is far higher.
Credit Checking. Security  and Conflict Resolution As in garments,  in spite of a daunting process for
formally pursuing collection  of credit in the courts, nearly 90% of firms grant credit to new customers.
Credit is  assured through a  variety of  means other than formal collection procedures, including
infornation, use of down payments,  and the right of repossession. Figure 4 demonstrates  that machine
tool firms use similar means to those used by garmnent  firms, though somewhat  fewer firms apply each
method.  Aside from checking references and using credit agencies, 28% of firms check with banks
about the record of new customers. This common method is informal and carries no explicit fee: it is
attained through the establishment  of an understanding  between the manager of the machine tool firm
and the bank manager.
Yet although credit is common, it is extended on a  relatively small part of the value of
machinery. In the past, over three quarters of the price of a machine  tool was paid for by FINAME
(the Agency for Industrial Finance), a govemment program of subsidized finance for capital goods.
Currently,  FINAME  finances 50% of the price of many machine  tool sales, a significant  reduction from
earlier levels of up to 80%.  As noted above, an average of 43% of the value of customized  machines
must be paid well before delivery.  So, generally,  supplier  credit is extended on only 5 to 10% of the
total value of the machine (although  the situation  is differept  with some lower-value,  serially-produced
machines).
Final payment is guaranteed  several ways.  First, the customer depends on the supplier for
service and parts for the machine.  Thus the customer has a powerful incentive to maintain a good
relationship  with the supplier  (and vice versa: parts and maintenance  were the only business  some firms
were doing during the recession). Second, the typical contract for customized  mrachinery  includes a
clause under which the manufacturer  retains title to the machine tool until final payment is made.  A
customer  who has paid from 50 to 95% of the value of a machine  thus has a strong disincentive  to lose
that investment. In this regard,  the formal  legal systen.  does seem  to act as guarantor  of property  rights:
several businesses  reported isolated incidents  of having reclaimed  machinery  with formal authorization
or even with the accompaniment  of a police officer.
Thus, the cases that end up in cartorio 20 were generally reported to be those involving less
valuable standardized  machines  or parts. In fact, there is a significant  negative  correlation  between  the
percent of production produced to  order (which is  likely to  be customized) and the percent of
transactions in which payments  are late (r=-.36, significant  at the 5% level).  Even thus qualified,  the
rate of protest of duplicatas 2' to the car:o'rio  (an officially  sanctioned  credit collection and information
agency) is considerably  lower in the machine  tool industry (1.7% of transactions)  than in the garnent
sector (4% of transactions) (see Table 3).  However, in the machine tool sector, fewer of those
customers reported to cartorio pay in cartorio, hence the incidence  of court cases is about the same as
in the garment sector as a percentage of total transactions (.1% of all transactions). One possible
explanation  is that machine  tools firms reserve  the cartorio for customers  in genuine financial  hardship,
20  Cartorios are publicly  sanctioned  offices. They come in two major types: judicial (courts) and
extra-judicial (essentially notaries).  The extrajudicial  cartorios are publicly granted private, highly
profitable businesses, oligopolized  by a few families for many generations. There are five types of
extra-judicial  cartorios. In this study, the relevant  cartorio is the tabelionatos  de protesto de titulos,
where bad debts and bad checks can be "protested".
21  Duplicatas are signed invoices  acknowledging  receipt of goods. In the garment industry, they
were an important  means for suppliers  to extend customers  credit, and could  be discounted  by suppliers
with banks to obtain short-term  finance.Figure  4
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and who are therefore less likely to be able to pay in cartorio. Needless to say, the number of court
cases per firm is much lower, as the number of transactions  per firm is much lower in machine tools
than in garments.  Furthermore, machine tool firms are less likely to have sued for any non-credit
reason: while 54% of responding  garment  firms reported  having been involved in such a suit in recent
years, only 35% of responding  machine tool firms reported  such a history.
TABLE 3:  RESOLUTION  OF LATE PAYMENT  OF DEBT (in 'normal times')
][_MACHINE  TOOLS  GARMENTS
Of all duplicatas:
% of Total Paid Late  9.0%  8.0%
% of Total Paid Late and  1.7%  4.0%
Reported  _
% of Total Paid Late, Reported,  .3%  .3%
and Not Paid in Cartorio
% of Total  Resulting  in Law Suits  .1%  .1%
VI. Constraints  to growth and future operation: The priority  placed on obstacles  faced by the machine
tools industry largely confirmed  the rankings identified  by garment firms. Figure 5 demonstrates  that
the top tier of three constraints, the second tier of three constraints, and the lowest tier of three
constraints are identical between the two industries.  As with garment firms, we asked Brazilian
machine tools entrepreneurs  to rate various obstacles to growth and future operation on a I to 5 scale,
with one meaning "no obstacle", three meaning "a moderate obstacle" and five meaning a  "severe
obstacle." These values are normalized  on a zero to one scale in Figure 5.  Their ratings again gave
priority, not to those constraints  directly related  to legal and regulatory institutional  reform, but rather
to those pertaining  to overall economic  management. The three factors seen as the greatest obstacles
to reform  are policy uncertainty,  price instability  and inflation,  and the high level of taxes. The second
tier of obstacles  relates to tax bureaucracy,  labor  regulation  and the high cost of financing. Respondents
placed obstacles related to the formal legal system and formal conflict resolution (i.e. renegotiated
contracts, payment a7ears and debts owed) at the end of a long list of complaints. Once again, our
research establishes  that reform of formal legal systems and formal conflict resolution mechanisms  is
not a priority for Brazilian  business. Figure 6 recalls how different Brazil is from a country with more
stable macroeconomic  management -- Chilean firms demonstrated  a greater homogeneity  of scores
between responses,  and placed an input-related  factor as their leading constraint.
VII.  Conclusions: As in the case of the garment study, we find evidence contradicting  the prediction
of legal formalism that formal institutions centrally constrain private sector development.  Such an
approach misdirects attention away from the most constraining  obstacles in the business environment.
Overall,  the findings from the machine  tools industry  appear, instead,  to confirm  two conclusions  of the
earlier garment sector study:
I)  Institutional substitutes for superior regulation and formal legal processes facilitate the
resolution of conflict in business-government  and business-business  transactions.
2)  Overall macroeconomic  instability  due to unpredictable  changes in prices and policies and
a  high fiscal burden on formal enterprises impose binding constraints on the growth andLevel  of Diffiaulty  Level  of Difficulty
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operation of private enterprise in Brazil. Even once this constraint is relieved, other constraints
(e.g. tax and labor regulation, access to inputs, infrastructure) are likely to be more binding on
businesses than constraints related to formal conflict resolution.
We have seen that, even in a sector with less informal behavior and greater reliance on specific,
long-term contracts, problems of formal conflict resolution rank  low.  The machine tools  industry
displayed two features quite distinct from the garment sector.  First, machine tools firms manifested
greater formality of operations, as evidenced by lower reported jeitinho payments, a higher usage of
formal channels to challenge government rulings, fewer complaints about illegal behavior among other
furms  (or confessional tales about responding firms), and a slightly higher tendency to use the courts
to resolve unpaid debts.  Second, this sector, characterized  by more asset specific transactions, displayed
a higher rate of honoring orders and of timely payment.  We believe this outcome is not suggested by
a formnalistic  approach to business transactions, but is consistent with the literatu,e on NIE.  Formal
legal conflict resolution mechanisms are too expensive to guarLitee contracts in conoitions of high asset
specificity, therefore hostages are exchanged, and transactions proceed largely impervious  to the formnal
legal environment. 22
22  Note:  The Author would like to acknowledge the intellectual contribution of Brian Levy to this
article, as well as the support and comments of Geoffrey Shepherd (LAICO),  Paul Holden (LATTF)
and Mary Shirley (PSDFP).  The survey would not have been possible without the collaboration of the
trade association for the machine tools industry ABIMAQ and the special efforts of Drs. Aldo Pansiera
an(' Casimeiro Taleskis. Jan Peter Wogart provided valuable background material on the machine tools
industry.  Finally, the author thanks Thomas Magyar for his vital assistance in carrying out the surveys
and Charles Thomas for assistance in data entry and analysis.Poilcy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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